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CLOAK AND LEDGER:
IS CIA FUNDING CONSTITUTIONAL?
By Douglas P. Elliott*
The sovereign in this Nation is the people, not the bureaucracy.
The statement of accounts of public expenditures goes to the heart
of the problem of sovereignty. If taxpayers may not ask that rudi-
mentary question, their sovereignty becomes an empty symbol and
a secret bureaucracy is allowed to run our affairs.
Justice William 0. Douglas 1
Introduction
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 19492 established a
unique funding system by which Congress appropriates funds to other
governmental entities, which in turn transfer them to the CIA.3 The
only accounting required for expenditures of the CIA is a certificate
from its director.4 The result of these procedures is that the American
public, and all but a few members of Congress, have no access to in-
formation concerning CIA finances.
In the current controversy surrounding the CIA, these funding
procedures are being re-examined. The commission headed by Vice
President Rockfeller recently recommended that Congress give "careful
consideration to the question whether the budget of the CIA should
not, at least to some extent, be made public, particularly in view of the
provisions of Article 1, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution." 4a This
clause provides that:
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence
of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Ac-
* Member, second year class.
1. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 201 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
2. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (1970) [hereinafter referred to as CIA Act].
3. Id. § 403f.
4. Id. § 403j(b).
4a. COMMSSioN ON CIA Acvrmms WrrmN Tm UNrTrED STATES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 81 (June, 1975) [Hereinafter cited as ROCKEFELLER COMMISsION].
Shortly after the release of the commission report, Director of Central Intelligence
William Colby rejected the suggestion that his agency's budget be made public. Inter-
view, Meet the Press, National Broadcasting Co., June 29, 1975.
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count of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time.
Long before the CIA's recent emergence as a cause c61 bre, an
attempt was made to test the constitutionality of the agency's funding
in court. For seven years, William B. Richardson, an American citi-
zen and taxpayer from Greensburg, Pennsylvania, sought a judicial
determination of the question. Richardson, who had a legal educa-
tion, but was not a practicing attorney, engaged the United States gov-
ernment in complex litigation without the aid of counsel at the trial and
appellate levels.
This note examines the validity of Richardson's challenge. It
begins with a chronological account of the procedural barriers faced
by Richardson in his protracted and ultimately unsuccessful litigation.
The substantive discussion commences with an examination of the
statutes enacted to provide public disclosure of governmental finances,
and the modifications of normal accounting procedures that have
been authorized in order to provide confidentiality in certain in-
stances. The unique CIA procedures are then discussed, along with
relevant legislative history and reforms that have been proposed in
Congress over the years. The constitutionality of CIA appropriations
and expenditures is then analyzed in view of the relevant constitution-
al history and the dictates of national security. Finally, there is a brief
prognosis of the prospects for reforming the current procedures.
The Richardson Cases
Richardson's solitary quest began in 1967 when he wrote to the
Government Printing Office requesting documents "published by the
Government in compliance with Article I, section 9, clause 7 of the
United States Constitution. ' 5 A reply from the Fiscal Service of the
Bureau of Accounts of the Department of the Treasury informed Rich-
ardson that the department published the Combined Statement of Re-
ceipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the United States Government.
Richardson then wrote to the bureau, asking whether the CIA Act did
not raise questions concerning the authenticity of the Combined
Statement, and requesting further information on CIA expenditures.
In its reply, the bureau stated that no such information was
available.6
After unsuccessful efforts to prompt the Treasury Department to
seek an opinion from the attorney general concerning the constitution-
ality of the CIA Act, Richardson filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The suit against
5. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168 (1974).
6. Id.
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S.S. Sokol, commissioner of the Bureau of Accounts, sought a declar-
atory judgment ruling financing portions of the CIA Act be held un-
constitutional. In addition, he requested that the court find that the
defendant had failed to publish a statement of receipts and expendi-
tures of the CIA in compliance with constitutional requirements.7
On May 8, 1968, the district court dismissed the complaint on
the ground that Richardson lacked standing to sue because he had al-
leged no special injury."
Subsequent to that decision, the United States Supreme Court
eased the standing requirement for certain taxpayer actions, fashion-
ing a two-pronged test in Flast v. Cohen.9 Richardson argued on ap-
peal that he satisfied the newly articulated test. The Third Circuit,
however, affirmed the dismissal on the ground that Richardson had
failed to allege that the matter in controversy exceeded the value or
sum of $10,000, as required for federal jurisdiction.'0
On January 8, 1970, Richardson filed a new action in the same
district court. He sought a writ of mandamus to compel the secretary
of the treasury to publish an accounting of CIA receipts and expendi-
tures, and a writ of prohibition to enjoin further publication of the
combined statement which failed to reflect them. He asserted jurisdic-
tion under the Mandamus and Venue Act," which confers original ju-
risdiction upon the federal district courts in mandamus actions to
compel federal employees to perform duties owed to the plaintiff. The
district court ordered the case dismissed for lack of standing; in addi-
tion, the complaint was held to be non-justiciable because it presented
a political question.' 2
Richardson's subsequent appeal was considered by the Third
Circuit en banc. On July 20, 1972, in a six-to-three decision, the court
vacated the dismissal order and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings by a three-judge district court."3 Writing for the majority,
7. Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866, 867 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
8. Id.
9. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). "The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two as-
pects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a
nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement al-
leged... . When both nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpay-
er's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party
to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction." Id. at 102-03.
10. Richardson v. Sokol, 409 F.2d 3, 4-5 (3d Cir. 1969).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
12. The district court's decision was not published. The disposition of the case
was explained in the appellate opinion. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844. 847
(3d Cir. 1972).
13. Id.
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Judge Max Rosenn rejected the government's contention that the first
prong of the Flast test permitted standing only to plaintiffs challeng-
ing appropriations per se.14 In considering the second prong, the
court found that Richardson's claim concerned a specific section of
the Constitution limiting the taxing and spending powers of Congress:
While article I, section 9, clause 7 is procedural in nature, [it is
nonetheless a limitation] on the taxing and spending power. It
would be difficult to fashion a requirement more clearly convey-
ing the framers' intention to regularize expenditures and to re-
quire public accountability.1 5
The court found that the political question issue, which the dis-
trict court had found to be fatal, was "intertwined with the merits,"
and would have to be developed at a subsequent hearing.' 6
The Supreme Court Resurrects the Standing Barrier
Pursuant to the governmenfs request, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, and on June 25, 1974, reversed the circuit
court in a five-to-four decisiony.7 In his majority opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Burger maintained that Flast "must be read with reference to its
principal predecessor, Frothingham v. Mellon,""' and quoted from
that case:
The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show
not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefi-
nite way in common with people generally.' 9
Construing the Flast and Frothingham decisions very narrowly,
the chief justice maintained that the "mere recital" of Richardson's
claim when examined against the statute under attack, demonstrated
"how far he falls short of the standing criteria of Flast and how neatly he
falls within the Frothingham holding left undisturbed."20  Burger
noted that although Richardson relied upon his taxpayer status for
standing, his claim. was not addressed to the taxing and spending
power, but rather to statutes regulating the CIA. Richardson alleged
no violation of a constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending
14. "We believe that the nexus between a taxpayer and an allegedly unconstitu-
tional act need not always be the appropriation and the spending of his money for an
invalid purpose. The personal stake may come from any injury in fact even if it is not
directly economic in nature." Id. at 853.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 856.
17. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
18. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 172.
20. Id. at 174-75.
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power, but rather asked the courts to require that the government pro-
vide him with detailed information about the spending of CIA funds.
Thus, according to Burger:
[T]here is no "logical nexus" between the asserted status of taxpayer
and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the Executive
to supply a more detailed report of the expenditures of that
agency.21
Burger summarized the question presented as a narrow one of
whether Richardson's claim met the Flast standard for taxpayer
standing. He held that it did not. The chief justice concluded that both
Frothingham and Flast denied standing to plaintiffs, such as Richard-
son, who sought to use the federal courts as forums "in which to air...
generalized grievances about the conduct of the government."22
Chief Justice Burger was joined in his opinion by Justices White,
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist. Justice Powell, however, wrote a
separate concurring opinion urging repudiation of the Flast doctrine. 23
Finding the Flast "nexus" test lacking in "real meaning and ... prin-
cipled content, ' 24 he advocated establishing the results of Flast and
Baker v. Carr25 as a periphery for federal taxpayer and citizen stand-
ing in the absence of statutory authorization to the contrary. He main-
tained that all taxpayer suits were attempts to air "generalized griev-
ances," and urged his brethren to "explicitly reaffirm traditional
prudential barriers against such public actions. ' 26
Although Justice Powell conceded that the majority opinion's
application of the Flast test to Richardson's claim was "probably liter-
ally correct, '27 he did not believe the test to be a "sound or logical
limitation on standing. '28 With regard to the instant case, he candidly
acknowledged:
The intensity of [Richardson's] interest appears to bear no rela-
tionship to the fact that, literally speaking, he is not challenging
directly a congressional exercise of the taxing and spending power.
On the other hand, if the involvement of the taxing and spending
power has some relevance, it requires no great leap in reasoning
to conclude that the Statement and Accounts Clause. . .on which
respondent relies, is inextricably linked to that power. And that
clause might well be seen as a "specific" limitation on congressional
21. Id. at 175.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 180 (Powell, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 184.
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
26. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 (1974).
27. Id. at 184.
28. Id.
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spending. Indeed, it could be viewed as the most democratic of
limitations. 29
The four dissenting justices were able to avoid the policy issue of
where the line should be drawn with respect to taxpayer standing.
They emphasized Richardson's status as a citizen, rather than a tax-
payer, and concluded that he should have standing to assert his inter-
est as a citizen. Indeed, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, re-
jected the Court's entire analysis of the standing issue, arguing that the
Flast analysis was "simply not relevant to the standing question raised
in this case." 30 The issue raised by Richardson was not whether Con-
gress had engaged in taxing and spending in excess of constitutional
authority, but whether the Constitution imposed upon the govern-
ment an affirmative duty "to all taxpayers or citizen-voters of the
Republic." 1
The Stewart analysis thus proceeded from a fundamentally dif-
ferent basis than that of the majority. Richardson was "in the position
of a traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff,"3 alleging that the statement
and account clause gave him the right to receive information and bur-
dened the government with a corresponding duty of supplying it:
Courts of law exist for the resolution of such right-duty disputes.
When a party is seeking a judicial determination that a defend-
ant owed him an affirmative duty, it seems clear . . . that he has
standing to litigate the issue of the existence vel non of this duty
once he shows that the defendant has declined to honor his claim. 3
When a specific duty was asserted, Stewart maintained, the duty
itself indicated a relationship between plaintiff and defendant suffi-
cient to insure that the court would not be used as a forum for general
grievances. The courts are clearly available for the enforcement of
duties arising from contracts between private parties, and:
when the asserted duty is, as here, as particularized, palpable, and
explicit as those which courts regularly recognize in private contexts,
it should make no difference that the obligor is the government and
the duty is embodied in our organic law.34
Justice Stewart concluded that it did not matter that those to whom
the duty is owed may be numerous. 5
Justice Brennan wrote an opinion,36 dissenting from the majori-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 205 (Stewart, I., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 203.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 204.
35. Id. In support of his conclusion, Justice Stewart quoted a prior opinion of th
Court: "[Sltanding is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same
injury." Id.
36. 418 U.S. at 235-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 2
CIA FUNDING
ty's holdings in Richardson and the companion case of Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee.8 7 Agreeing with Justice Stewart that the state-
ment and account clause conferred upon Richardson a specific right,
he observed that, properly construed, the complaint:
alleged that the violations caused him injury not only in respect of
his right as a citizen to know how Congress was spending the pub-
lic fisc, but also his right as a voter to receive information to aid
his decision how and for whom to vote. These claims may ulti-
mately fail on the merits, but Richardson has "standing" to assert
them.38
In his dissenting opinion,8 9 Justice Douglas devoted most of his
discussion to the merits of the case. As he was the only judge to do so
during the entire course of Richardson's litigation, his observations
are of particular interest.40 On the issue of standing, he remarked sim-
ply that "resolutions of any doubts or ambiguities should be toward
protecting an individual's stake in the integrity of constitutional guar-
antees, rather than turning him away without even a chance to be
heard."4 ' For a more extensive presentation of his views on standing,
he referred to his dissenting opinion in Schlesinger.42
Justice Douglas found standing in the plaintiffs in both Richard-
son and Schlesinger because:
The interest of citizens in guarantees written in the Constitution
seems obvious . . . . The Executive Branch under our regime is
not a fiefdom or principality competing with the Legislative as an-
other center of power. It operates within a constitutional frame-
work, and it is that . . . framework that these citizens want to
keep intact. That is, in my view, their rightful concern.43
While the litigant must have a personal stake in the outcome, Justice
Douglas saw no need that that stake be a monetary one.44
All four dissenters approached the standing issue from a funda-
mentally different perspective than did the majority. Nonetheless, the
37. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
38. Id. at 236 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 197-202 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
40. See text accompanying notes 136-38 infra.
41. 418 U.S. at 202 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 418 U.S. 208, 229-35 (1974) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). In this opinion, Justice Douglas began with the observation that the
standing requirement is a "judicially created instrument" which serves three ends: (1)
protection of the status quo "by reducing the challenges that may be made to it and its
institutions"; (2) the barring from the courts of "political questions"; and (3) the rid-
ding from the court dockets of questions which are abstract or involve no "concrete
controversial issue." Id. at 229.
43. Id. at 234.
44. Id. See also note 14 supra.
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decision brought Richardson's fortunes full circle. The majority opin-
ion put Richardson in precisely the same position he had been in after
the district court's ruling on his first case45 more than six years earli-
er: outside the courthouse, unable to get in. Thus, the important con-
stitutional issue raised by Richardson remains unresolved. It is to this
issue that the remainder of this note addresses itself.
Statutory Appropriation and Accounting Provisions
A brief examination of statutory appropriation and accounting
requirements will aid in the analysis of the substantive constitutional is-
sues raised by the Richardson cases. In compliance with the constitu-
tional provision regarding appropriations, the president annually sub-
mits a proposed budget to Congress, requesting a specific appropria-
tion for each department or agency, and breaking that appropriation
down into separate amounts to be used by the agency for specified pur-
poses. Congress then reviews the requests, makes modifications it deems
desirable, and ultimately makes its appropriations. 6
Compliance with the constitutional accounting requirement was
first provided by statute in 1789, when the First Congress enacted
legislation creating the treasury department.47 The act provided, inter
alia, that the treasurer annually present each house of Congress with
"fair and accurate copies of all accounts" and "a true and perfect ac-
count of the state of the Treasury."4 The statute's modem counter-
part, which has been in effect since 1894, differs in some details, but
is essentially the same.49
Thus, from the earliest days of the Republic to the present, there
have been laws requiring that Congress be provided annually with a
complete and accurate accounting of receipts and expenditures of all
federal agencies. Although there is no record of such reports ever
being withheld from the public, since 1950 there has been a separate
statutory provision guaranteeing public access to information con-
cerning how tax money is spent:
45. Richardson v. Sokol, 285 F. Supp. 866 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
46. For a detailed account of the process, see generally R. FENNo, Tim POWER OF
TRE PuRsE (1966).
47. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, Ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 65.
48. Id. § 4 (emphasis added). The House subsequently passed a resolution speci-
fying that the account was to be broken down by "each head of appropriation." 2 AN-
NALS OF CONG. 302 (1792).
49. 31 U.S.C. § 1029 (1970). "It shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treas-
ury annually to lay before Congress ... an accurate, combined statement of the receipts
and expenditures during the last preceding fiscal year of all public moneys, . . . desig-
nating the amount of the receipts, whenever practicable, by ports, districts, and States,
and the expenditures, by each separate head of appropriation." Id.
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The Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for the
information of the President, the Congress, and the public as will
present the results of the financial operations of the Govern-
ment .... 50
Modification of Normal Accounting Procedure
On occasion Congress has found it desirable to provide a meas-
ure of confidentiality in the conduct and financial accounting of cer-
tain governmental affairs. On such occasions Congress has created
statutory modifications of normal accounting procedures.
The first such occasion was in 1793, when the Second Congress
enacted a law granting the president discretion to authorize special ac-
counting and selective public disclosure of financial data related to
expenditures made "for the purposes of intercourse or treaty, with
foreign nations, in pursuance of any law."' The law further provided
that a certificate completed by the president or the secretary of state
concerning expenditures whose record was to be withheld from public
disclosure would be "a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therein
expressed to have been expended." 52 A virtually identical version of
this provision is still law today,5 3 and the secretary of state is permit-
ted to delegate his certification authority to subordinates.54
For most of the nation's history, the provision for secret foreign
affairs expenditures was the only statutory exception to the rule of full
financial disclosure. 55 Shortly before the United States entered World
War I, however, Congress authorized confidentiality in the expendi-
ture of funds for navy intelligence-gathering.50 This authorization
gave the secretary of the navy the same powers in intelligence expend-
50. 31 U.S.C. § 66b(a) (1970) (emphasis added). In response to this mandate,
the Treasury Department publishes its CONMIED STATEMENT, which "is recognized as
the official publication of the details of receipt and outlay data with which all other re-
ports containing similar data must be in agreement. In addition to serving the needs
of Congress, [the report is used by] the general public in its continuing review of the
operations of government." U.S. DEP'T oF TREASURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RE-
CEipTS, ExPmENnrruR.s, Am) BALANCES oF TiE UNITED STATES GovERNmENT 1 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as COMBINED STATEMENT].
51. Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 300.
52. Id.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
54. Id. § 107a.
55. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has observed that the power to account
for expenditures by certificate only was "a power enjoyed in the early republic only by
Presidents." A SCHLEsINGEi, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 316 (1973). The statement
is slightly inaccurate, however, since the secretary of state also had this power. See text
accompanying note 52 supra.
56. 31 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
Summer 19751
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
itures as those accorded to the president in foreign affairs expendi-
tures. 57
In recent years, confidentiality has been authorized in other sen-
sitive areas. The legislation creating the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) contained a provision that "[amny Act appropriating funds to
the Commission may appropriate specified portions thereof to be ac-
counted for upon certification of the Commission only."'
Similarly, Congress has provided that:
Appropriations for the Federal Bureau of Investigation are avail-
able for expenses of unforseen emergencies of a confidential char-
acter, when so specified in the appropriation concerned, to be spent
under the direction of the Attorney General. The Attorney Gen-
eral shall certify the amount spent that he considers advisable not
to specify, and his certification is a sufficient voucher for the
amount therein expressed to have been spent. 9
A comparison of these provisions reveals certain common char-
acteristics: (1) in each case Congress appropriates funds to the agen-
cy in question in the normal manner; (2) only particular portions of
these appropriations are exempted from normal accounting proce-
dures; (3) specified persons are assigned the responsibility of deter-
mining whether disclosure of specific expenditures should be exempt-
ed in the national interest; and (4) such exemptions are exceptions to
the normal rule of full disclosure accounting procedures for the agen-
cies in question.
There are additional safeguards which apply to AEC and FBI
accounting. Congress appropriates to these agencies designated sums
which may be used for confidential purposes, 0 and these amount to
only miniscule portions of the total appropriations for the agencies.0 '
Furthermore, in the case of the FBI these funds are designated for
emergency use, and may be exempt from accounting procedures
only at the direction of the attorney general, an official outside the bu-
reau with the responsibility for its supervision. 62
57. Id. § 107.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2017(b) (1970).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 537 (1970) (emphasis added).
60. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
61. The budget for fiscal year 1975 called for a total AEC appropriation of ap-
proximately $2.3 billion, of which a maximum of $100,000 (0.0043%) was designated
for confidential expenditures. The total appropriation for the FBI was approximately
$435 million, of which a maximum of $70,000 (0.0161%) was designated for confiden-
tial expenditures. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF TIE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APPENDIX 753, 608 (fiscal year 1975) [hereinafter cited
as APPENDIX TO THE BUDGET].
62. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
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Central Inteligence-The Great Exception
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 194963 has been de-
scribed as "a piece of legislation which is unique in the American sys-
tem." 4 The act authorizes the agency to:
Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies such sums
as may be approved by the Office of Management and Budget
. . . for the performance of any of the functions or activities au-
thorized under . . . this title, and any other Government agency
is authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums
without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting
transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency
in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the pur-
poses and under the authority of. .. this title without regard to
limitations of appropriations from which transferred .... 65
The act further provides that:
The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the ex-"
penditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential,
extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be ac-
counted for solely on the certificate of the Director [which] shall
be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.60
Chief Justice Burger understated the matter somewhat when he
observed that the above section "provides different accounting and re-
porting requirements and procedures for the CIA, as is also done with
respect to other governmental agencies dealing in confidential
areas." 67  In support of his reference to other agencies, the chief justice
cited the statutory sections dealing with FBI, AEC, and foreign af-
fairs appropriations, 8 ignoring the fact that the CIA procedures are
actually quite different from those of the other agencies.69 In fact the
63. 50 U.S.C. §§ 403a-403j (1970).
64. V. MARCHETrI & J. MARKS, THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE 63
(1974) [hereinafter cited as MARcuari & MARKS]. (While this is the most recent and
comprehensive source of information on many aspects of the CIA, it should be noted
that the authors are decidedly critical of the agency.)
65. 50 U.S.C. § 403f (1970) (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 403j(b) (emphasis added).
67. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974).
68. Id. n.7.
69. One commentator has described the various appropriation and accounting pro-
cedures as "a continuum of practices from full disclosure to strict secrecy." Note, The
CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution, 84 YALE L.J. 608, 616 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Secret Funding]. The formulation may be slightly misleading, however, 'since
the term "continuum" implies a steady progression from one extreme to the other. It
would be more appropriate to view full disclosure as the norm, with AEC, FBI and for-
eign affairs disclosure practices slight deviations from the norm, and the CIA procedure
an extreme deviation from the norm. The slight deviations are actually much closer
to full disclosure than they are to total secrecy. See text accompanying notes 51-62 cu-
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CIA Act provided for radical departure from the practices required of
other agencies, for the CIA was granted wholesale exemption from any
published accounting of its receipts and expenditures.7" The confidential
certification of the director of central intelligence is the only documenta-
tion required for the expenditures of public funds generally estimated to
amount to at least $750 million per year.71 This allows the director "far
more authority to operate secretly than any other agency head."72
Under the operation of the CIA Act, Congress makes no direct
appropriation for the CIA. 73 This practice differs from that used with
respect to every other governmental agency. CIA funds are disbursed
through a two-step procedure whereby money is appropriated by
Congress to other agencies, which in turn transfer the funds to the
CIA. Thus, CIA funds are concealed within the budgets and accounts
of other agencies. 74
70. This, at least, has been the CIA's interpretation of the act. But see Comarr-
TEES ON CIVIL RiGHTS & INTERNAT'L HUMAN RIGnTS, ASS'N OF TrH BAR OF THE CrIy
OF NEW YoRK, THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: OVERSIGH-T AND AccouNTAnnry
24 (1975) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT & AccOuNTABmIrrY].
71. MAcnHrTn & MARKS, supra note 64, at 61; 119 CoNG. REc. 6868 (daily ed.
April 10, 1973) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
The CIA actually controls a significantly larger amount of money through its "pro-
prietary" corporations (ostensibly private companies that are actually fronts for CIA op-
erations). Also, some of the projects it directs are financed by the Defense Department.
Taking these facts into account, one CIA official has said that the agency's director op-
erates a "multibillion-dollar conglomerate." MAcHETrI & MARKS, supra note 64, at 61-
62 (emphasis in original). Another source has stated that as of 1967, the CIA was
spending $1.5 billion annually. D. WIsE & T. Ross, THE ESPIONAGEF ESTABLISHMENT
172 (1967).
72. OvERsmIHT & AccouNTAnmrry, supra note 70, at 27.
73. On occasion direct appropriations have been made to the CIA for construction
purposes, and the amounts have been published. The government's financial publica-
tions therefore have listings for the CIA, but only the construction figures are provided.
See, e.g., APPENDIX To THm BUDGET, supra note 61, at 884 (fiscal year 1972); CoM-
BINED STATEMENT, supra note 50, at 421 (fiscal year 1972).
74. In a letter to Senator William Proxmire, Office of Management and Budget
Director Roy L. Ash described the CIA funding procedures in some detail: "The spe-
cific amounts of the agency's approved appropriation request and the identification of
the appropriation estimates in the President's annual Budget, within which these amounts
are included, are formally provided by the Director of OMB to the Chairman of the
Senate and House Appropriations Committees; similarly the Director is informed by
them of the determination of the CIA budget, and OMB approval of the transfer of
funds to CIA is based upon this decision.
"The transfer of funds ... is accomplished by the issuance of Treasury documents
routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The
amount and timing of these transfers. . . are approved by OMB.
"Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB for transfer to CIA are
limited to amounts notified to OMB by the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appro-
priations Committees. The specific appropriation accounts from which the funds will
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As a result of these procedures, the amount of the annual CIA
budget is known only to a "handful of Congressmen," and even they
generally have limited knowledge of how the funds are spent.75 Sub-
committees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have
responsibility for approving the CIA budget, and they share, with
subcommittees of the two Armed Services Committees, responsibility
for general oversight of the agency. 76 There are conflicting views on
how much attention is actually given the CIA budget by these sub-
committees, but apparently it is fairly minimal. 77
Legislative History
One might well question why Congress surrendered its normal
financial controls with respect to CIA appropriations and accounting.
In the years following World War U, it was widely believed that the
devastating Pearl Harbor attack that had precipitated United States
involvement in the war might have been avoided or its results mitigat-
ed if the country had a more dependable intelligence system.7 8  In or-
der to prevent a recurrence of this problem, and to provide a single in-
be transferred are also determined by this process." 120 CONG. Ruc. 9604 (daily ed.
June 4, 1974).
The letter indicated, in Senator Proxmire's words, that "only two men in the entire
Congress of the United States control the process by which the CIA is funded." Id.
at 8602.
75. MARcnnm & MAms, supra note 64, at 341.
76. For informative discussions of congressional oversight of the CIA and its
spending, see generally Note, Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can
Accountability and Confidentiality Coexist, 7 N.Y.UJ. INT'L L. & POL. 493 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Fiscal Oversight]; CIA: Congress in Dark About Activities, Spend-
ing, 29 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1840 (1971).
77. It has been said that the intelligence subcommittee of the House Appropria-
tions Committee "spends approximately four days each year reviewing the budget re-
quests of the CIA and other intelligence services." Fiscal Oversight, supra note 76, at
497. There are indications that the Senate subcommittee's budget review has been lack-
ing in intensity, although it has been meeting more frequently since 1971, and may
therefore be taking a more active role. Id. at 498-500.
Both subcommittees have been criticized for past laxity in reviewing the budget, ex-
emplified by an episode alleged to have occurred in 1967. It is said that the CIA invited
a member of the House subcommittee to attend a "rehearsal" of the agency's budget pre-
sentation. Because of his subsequent favorable assessment of the "rehearsal" presenta-
tion, the subcommittee dispensed with the agency's formal budget presentation. On the
basis of representations of the House panel's chairman, the Senate subcommittee likewise
dispensed with the budget presentation. Thus, for that year, the CIA budget was ap-
proved without any congressional hearing whatsoever. MARcH-mrI & MARKs, supra note
64, at 346-47. Senator Mike Mansfield has charged that "both the executive and legisla-
tive branches have been inexcusably lax in supervising intelligence activities." REPORT,
COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CoNDUCT OF FoREIGN
PoLIcy, 231-32, (June, 1975) (Comments by Senator Mike Mansfield).
78. See, e.g., 95 CoNG. REC. 1948 (1949) (remarks of Senator Tydings).
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tegrated intelligence product, President Truman created the Central
Intelligence Group by presidential directive in 1946."' The following
year, the agency was renamed and its function codified in the Nation-
al Security Act of 1947.0 That legislation made no provision for
funding, and apparently funds were transferred from the Defense De-
partment budget without statutory authorization.8 1 The Central Intelli-
gence Agency Act of 194982 was designed to define more specifically
the role and operations of the agency.
The mood of the nation in the post-war years was characterized
by widespread apprehension over covert Communist activities. Con-
gress thus considered the CIA Act, in what has been described by one
source as "an atmosphere of Cold War tension." 3 A participant in
the consideration described the atmosphere in more colorful terms as
a "wave of hysteria. '84
The proposed CIA Act reached the floor of the House of Repre-
sentatives on March 7, 1949. Representative Lansdale Sasscer intro-
duced the bill and provided a brief description of some of its provi-
sions. At the conclusion of his presentation he remarked that without
the appropriations and accounting language, there could "be no suc-
cessful operation of an intelligence service."
8 5
Ironically, there was less debate over the secrecy provided by the
funding provision than over the secrecy surrounding the legislation it-
self. Early in the debate, Representative Emanuel Celler, while indi-
cating he would not oppose the bill, voiced objection to the surrepti-
tious manner in which it was presented:
Certainly if the members of the Armed Forces [sic] Committee
can hear the detailed information to support this bill, why cannot
our entire membership? Are they the Brahmins and we the un-
touchables?8 6
79. Presidential Directive of Jan. 22, 1946, 3 C.F.R. 1080 (1943-48 Comp.).
One commentator has observed that the Central Intelligence Group rested on a ten-
uous foundation: "Not only was it the creature of executive order and hence highly sus-
ceptible to elimination at the whim of the President or his successor, but it was wholly
dependent upon its three constituent Departments-Army, Navy, and State-for funds,
facilities, and personnel." Walden, The C.A.: A Study in the Arrogation of Admin-
istrative Powers, 39 GEO. WASH. L. Ruv. 66, 71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Walden].
80. 50 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., as amended; 5 U.S.C. § 171-2, 171 b, k-n (1970).
81. The act did authorize the agency to spend "[alny unexpended balances of ap-
propriations, allocations, or other funds available or authorized to be made available"
to the Central Intelligence Group. 50 U.S.C. § 403(f) (2) (1970).
82. Id. §§ 403a-403j.
83. MARcHcTTi & MARKs, supra note 64, at 8.
84. 95 CONG. Ruc. 1946 (1949) (remarks of Representative Marcantonio).
85. Id. at 1945 (remarks of Representative Sasscer).
86. Id. (remarks of Representative Celler).
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More strident in his criticism was Representative Vito Marcanto-
nio, the only member of either house to speak in opposition to the bill.
Marcantono called his colleagues' attention to the report of the
Armed Services Committee, which acknowledged that full and de-
tailed explanations of some of the bill's provisions had not been made
because of the "highly confidential nature" of such information."
Marcantonio asserted that the report made every section of the bill
suspect, and warned his colleagues that in passing the bill they would
be "suspending [their] legislative prerogatives and evading their
duty to the people of this Nation.""" He specifically opposed the ex-
penditure provisions, maintaining that their enactment would amount
to "suspending all laws with regard to Government expenditures."8 9
More indicative of the prevailing viewpoint, however, was Represent-
ative Dewey Short, who remarked:
We are engaged in a highly dangerous business. It is something
I naturally abhor but sometimes you are compelled to fight fire
with fire. . . . [P]erhaps 1he less we say in public about this
bill the better off all of us will be.90
Little more was said about the bill before the House approved it by an
overwhelming majority of 348 to 4.?1
On May 27, 1949, the bill was introduced for debate in the Sen-
ate, where it lacked even the minimal vocal opposition it had received
in the House. A few senators expressed misgiving about various
provisions of the bill, but its sponsor, Armed Services Committee
Chairman Millard Tydings, was able to allay such concerns with
somewhat vague reassurances.
For example, Senator Kenneth McKellar expressed doubts over
the wisdom of the provision allowing the transfer of funds, noting its
inconsistency with appropriation procedures employed for other
agencies. 2 Senator Tydings interrupted McKellar to explain that in-
telligence gathering was not a "normal function of the government,
like... building a bridge."93 He argued the processing of convention-
al vouchers might result in the disclosure of the names and activities
of CIA agents, thereby exposing them to grave personal risks. It was,
Tydings maintained, "a matter of life and death."94
87. Id. at 1946 (remarks of Representative Marcatonio).
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 1947 (remarks of Representative Short) (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 1948 (roll call vote).
92. Id. at 6955 (remarks of Senator McKellar).
93. Id. (remarks of Senator Tydings).
94. Id. It is a matter of conjecture whether Tydings was using the term "agent"
in the popular but somewhat inaccurate sense, or in the narrower sense in which the
CIA uses the word:
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This argument may have had some validity. It did not, however,
justify the concealment of ,all CIA appropriations and expenditures.
Tydings gave no indication of why the CIA could not follow the prac-
tice of other agencies which were authorized to use appropriated
funds for particularly sensitive activities without an accounting.95
There was no expression of concern in the Senate over the con-
stitutionality of the proposed appropriations procedures associated
with the CIA Act. In fact, Tydings argued that they were really quite
democratic. He maintained that a common practice used by other
governments in financing their intelligence activities was to "simply
appropriate a disguised sum of money, without any authority of
law."96 He then noted that:
We are writing the whole law out. I regret we cannot proceed in
any other way. If the Senate knew about the details, it might be
willing to do as other countries do, but we do not do business that
way. We are throwing every possible democratic safeguard around
it as we go along.97
With this assurance, the Senate passed the bill without a rollcall
vote.98
Second Thoughts About Secrecy
In the years that followed the passage of the CLk Act, a number
of members of Congress began to question whether the extreme secre-
cy surrounding the CIA was entirely necessary or desirable. Since pas-
sage of the act, there have been over 150 legislative proposals to sub-
ject the agency to greater scrutiny,99 although until recent months
none had ever passed either house.
Few of these proposals have been aimed at exposing CIA activi-
ties to the public view. Rather, they have been directed toward in-
"'Agent' is a word that is used to signify the people who work at the end of the
line. Usually they are foreigners and the instruments through - hich CIA operations
are executed. The word 'agent' is never used to describe the CIA career employee who
functions in a station as an operations officer-more commonly known as a case offi-
cer." P. AGEE, INSmD THE CoMwANY: CIA DiARY 90 (British Penguin ed., 1975)
[hereinafter cited as AGEE].
Of the estimated total of 16,500 CIA career employees, only about 5,000 serve over-
seas. MARcHmTr & MAms, supra note 64, at 61. For geographic reasons alone, most
CIA employees would therefore seem to face little danger of personal harm.
95. See text accompanying notes 51-62 supra.
96. 96 CoNG. Rlc. 6955 (remarks of Senator Tydings). In fact, this is apparently
how the CIA was funded prior to the 1949 act. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
97. 95 CoNo. REc. 6955 (remarks of Senator Tydings).
98. Id. at 6956.
99. MAR CmTrI & MAnms, supra note 64, at 342. The number may be considerably
higher. More than eight years ago, Senator Fulbright stated that over two hundred such
resolutions had been introduced. 112 CoNG. Ruc. 15673 (1966).
[Vol. 2
creasing congressional oversight of the agency. The first major effort
in this direction was a resolution introduced in the Senate in 1956 by
Senator Mike Mansfield. 100 The resolution, which would have estab-
lished a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, was defeated by a
vote of 59 to 27.101 All subsequent efforts to establish such a "watch-
dog" committee have met similar fates.' 02
Relatively little congressional attention has been directed toward
the question of whether the CIA budget should be a matter of public
record. A notable exception to this indifference to public disclosure
was a bill introduced in 1971 by Senator George McGovern. 10 The
bill provided for a direct appropriation to the CIA, and publication of
the appropriation as a single sum. It also prohibited the transfer to the
CIA of funds appropriated to another agency.10 4 If this seemingly
modest proposal had been enacted, the CIA's budget still would have
been more secret than that of any other independent federal agency.
Still, it must have appeared to many a radical departure from existing
practices.
Senator McGovern cited two major purposes of the bill: "to al-
low the Congress to exercise its constitutional powers over Federal fi-
nances by knowing where the administration proposed to allocate
each tax dollar;" and "to allow Congress and the taxpayer to know
100. S. Con. Res. 2, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
101. 102 CONG. Rrc. 6068 (1956) (roll call vote).
102. The situation is changing in the Ninety-fourth Congress, however. Early this
year, the Senate voted to establish a select committee to study the activities of the vari-
ous intelligence agencies. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.). Several
weeks later, the House followed suit by creating its own select committee. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 7 (city ed.). As of this writing, the House select
committee has just begun its investigation. The Senate panel, though, has been
operational for some time, and appears to be conducting a thorough inquiry. It seems
likely that this investigation will lead to the formation of a standing committee to
scrutinize intelligence agencies. The Rockefeller Commission has recommended the
establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. ROCKEFELLER COMMIssION, supra
note 4a, at 81.
103. S. 2231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The text of the bill appears in 117
CONG. Ra_. 23692 (1971).
104. The bill provided in part that:
"(1) [T]he Budget of the United States . . . shall show proposed appropriations,
estimated expenditures, and other related data for the Central Intelligence Agency, and
(2) appropriations shall be made to the Central Intelligence Agency in an appro-
priate appropriation Act. . . . [P]roposed appropriations, estimated expenditures, and
other related data set forth in the Budget for the Central Intelligence Agency, and ap-
propriations made to the Agency, may be shown as a single sum with respect to all func-
tions and activities of the Agency.
"See. 2. Commencing with the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1972, no funds appro-
priated to any other Department or agency of the United States shall be made available
for expenditure by the Central Intelligence Agency." Id.
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the exact amount of money going into other Government pro-
grams. 1 °5
McGovern described the practice of hiding CIA appropriations
in those of other agencies as "completely contrary to our democratic
principles and perhaps to the Constitution itself."108, He continued:
The American people have a right to know the purposes for which
their tax dollars are used. Their elected representatives have the
right to decide the priorities of the Nation as expressed in the Fed-
eral budget.lor
This conviction notwithstanding, the McGovern bill met the fate
of most other proposals to shed more light on the CIA-a quiet death
in committee.
Later the same year, more serious consideration was given to a
proposal by Senator Stuart Symington. The proposal, in the form of
an amendment to a defense appropriation bill,108 would have placed a
105. 117 CONG. REc. 23692 (1971) (remarks of Senator McGovern) (emphasis
added).
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 174 inf ra.
McGovern also expressed a personal concern about possible CIA use of agriculture
appropriations. Id. The senator had served as head of the Food for Peace program
in the early days of the Kennedy administration, and may well have been concerned
about accusations that over a six-year period, nearly $700 million from Food for Peace
appropriations had been diverted to military assistance programs, allegedly including
CIA-directed paramilitary operations in Laos. See Fisher, Executive Shell Game-Hid-
ing Billions from Congress, Tim NATION, Nov. 15, 1971, in 117 CONG. Rc. 40736
(1971). Regarding this use of Food for Peace funds, Fisher quoted Senator Proxmire:
'This seems to me a kind of Orwellian perversion of the language; food for peace could
be called food for war." 117 CONG. Rec. at 40737.
Others have maintained that the CIA receives its entire funding from Defense De-
partment appropriations: "All of the Invisible Government's hidden money is buried in
the Defense Department budget, mainly in the multi-billion-dollar weapons contracts,
such as those for the Minutemen and Polaris missiles." D. WisE & T. Ross, THE IN-
vsmrn GOVEamNmNT 260 (1964) [hereinafter cited as WisE & Ross]. Another com-
mentator has stated that "the great bulk of the C.LA.'s funds almost surely comes from
the Defense budget. . . . Furthermore, most of the. . . funds may be even more speci-
fically located in the better than $5 billion itemized simply as 'Intelligence and Com-
munications' and not given a further word of explanation in the Defense Program and
Budget." Futterman, Toward Legislative Control of the C.LA., 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &
POL. 431, 441 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Futterman].
Thus, while both sources agree that the money comes from the Defense budget, they
differ as to which portion of that budget it comes from. The item mentioned by Profes-
sor Futterman may actually be used only to fund the various intelligence agencies under
the control of the Defense Department, some of which are kept under even greater
secrecy than the CIA. The total annual budget of the National Security Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and Army, Air Force and Naval Intelligence has been esti-
mated at $5.4 billion. MARcHTmm & MARKs, supra note 64, at 80.
108. H.R. 11731, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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ceiling of $4 billion on funds available for use by the CIA, the Na-
tional Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the mil-
itary intelligence services. 109
Symington candidly acknowledged that one of his purposes in
introducing the amendment was to provide greater congressional ac-
cess to information on intelligence appropriations. 110 He challenged
the view that the mere function of the intelligence agencies in itself
demanded secrecy in appropriations, maintaining that this was incon-
sistent with policies pertaining to similarly vital information on appro-
priations for military equipment. "There is nothing secret," he re-
minded his colleagues, "about the . . .cost of a nuclear aircraft
carrier, or the cost of the C-5A."' Knowledge of costs, argued Sym-
ington, did not equal knowledge of how the weapons would be uti-
lized. Similarly, "knowledge of the overall cost of intelligence does not
in any way entail the release of knowledge about how the various in-
telligence groups function, or plan to function.""' 2
These arguments did not persuade Senator John Stennis, chair-
man of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Stennis countered the
arguments in a manner reminiscent of Senator Tydings' original pros-
elytizing for the CIA Act, 1 3 maintaining that an intelligence agency
could not be run in the same manner as "a tax collector's office or the
HEW or some other such department.""14 With extraordinary candor,
Stennis then summarized the position of the proponents of financial
secrecy in a single sentence:
109. 117 CONG. Rnc. 42923 (1971). This would probably have resulted in a sig-
nificant reduction in total intelligence spending. This total was estimated at $4 billion
a decade ago. WISp & Ross, supra note 107, at 277-78. More recently, however, the
total has been estimated at more than $6.2 billion, $6.1 billion of which is spent by the
agencies mentioned by Senator Symington. MARCHETTI & MARKS, supra note 64, at
80.
110. 117 CoNG. REc. 42928 (1971) (remarks of Senator Symington).
111. Id. at 42925. In sharp contrast to the secrecy surrounding the CIA budget, the
Defense Department's military budget is published in considerable detail, totalling ninety
pages for fiscal year 1975. APPEND]x To Tnm BUDGET, supra note 61, at 265-355 (fiscal
year 1975). Included are such items as the amount the Army spends on the anti-ballis-
tic missile system, id. at 291; the Navy's figure for fleet ballistic missile ships, id. at
301; and the Air Force outlay for ballistic missiles, id. at 307.
In addition to the statistics, detailed explanations of the uses to which the funds
are to be put are published. One such explanation discussed plans to convert submarines
"from the Polaris to the Poseidon missile capability to improve our sea-based ballistic
missile weapons system. The activity also includes two Trident class ballistic missile
firing submarines capable of firing a larger undersea strategic missile." Id. at 301.
It should be remembered, however, that some of the figures published for weapons
procurement may include concealed CIA funds. See note 107 supra.
112. 117 CONG. RE. at 42925 (1971) (remarks of Senator Symington).
113. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
114. 117 CoNG. Rac. at 42930 (1971) (remarks of Senator Stennis).
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You have to make up your mind that you are going to have an
intelligence agency and protect it and shut your eyes some and take
what is coming."15
Senator Stennis seems to have articulated the concerns of the
majority of his colleagues, who defeated the Symington amendment
by a vote of 56 to 31.116
In 1974, Senator William Proxmire introduced an amendment
to the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for fiscal year
1975111 which, like the Symington amendment, would have resulted
in disclosure of the total amount appropriated for intelligence agen-
cies, but unlike the Symington proposal, would have placed no ceiling
on such appropriations. The Proxmire amendment was procedural
in nature, and would have required the director of central intelligence
to submit an unclassified budget request to Congress each year, dis-
closing the total requested appropriation.",
Proxmire termed the existing CIA funding methods a "sleight of
hand,"" 9 arguing that these procedures shielded the intelligence com-
munity from effective control by Congress, and "systematically de-
ceived Congress as to the size of other civilian budgets."'I2  In his
view, the essential question to be answered in the debate was: "Will
the public release of this aggregate budget in any way compromise our
national security?"' 2' He contended that it would not.
Senator Stennis challenged this contention, arguing that such
disclosure would "give to our adversaries all over the world . . . a
true index as to what our activities are.' 12  According to Senator John
115. Id. (emphasis added). Other senators expressed similar sentiments. Id. at
42928 (remarks of Senator Ellender), 42929 (remarks of Senator Young).
116. Id. at 42932 (roll call vote).
117. S. 3000, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
118. 120 CONG. REc. 9601 (daily ed. June 4, 1974). The amendment provided
that: "On or before March 1 each year the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit
an unclassified written report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds re-
quested in the budget, transmitted to the Congress pursuant to section 201 of the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 11), for the national intelligence program for
the next successful fiscal year." Id.
119. Id. at 9602 (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
120. Id. A similar viewpoint is held by Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, who
has disclosed that she once made an inquiry of the House parliamentarian as to proce-
dures for blocking an appropriation bill containing hidden CIA funds on the ground that
it was fraudulent. She was informed that there was no such procedure. Televised inter-
view with Elizabeth Holtzman on "Newsroom," KQED, San Francisco, Feb. 4, 1975.
121. 120 CONG. REc. 9602 (daily ed. June 4, 1974) (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
122. Id. (remarks of Senator Stennis). Later in the debate, Stennis elaborated on
the point: "If [the Soviets] are given this new information then certain deductions could
be made about how much of the budget is going for these different activities and the
first thing we know calculations are made and they come pretty close to being correct
as to how much is spent by the military, how much is spent in the civilian area, how
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McClellan, chairman of the Appropriations Committee disclosure of
the overall figure would be like putting "the camel's nose under the
tent."'23  McClellan and several other opponents of the amendment
feared that publication of the total intelligence budget figure would
result in concern over how the money was being spent, so that such
information would be revealed on the floor of Congress and then in
the press. 124 Senator John Pastore speculated about the possible pres-
ence of Russians in the press gallery. 25
Proxmire responded that nothing in his amendment would per-
mit the above chain of events to occur, and that knowledge of overall
intelligence expenditures was necessary for sound congressional judg-
ment on budget priorities. 2 6 This contention led to the following col-
loquy:
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator can find it out privately, but
he does not want to .... He wants to tell the world about it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. I think the world ought to know the over-
all figures.
Mr. PASTORE. Does the Senator mean Russia should
know?
Mr. PROXMIRE. Right.
Mr. PASTORE. My goodness, I quit.' 27
Proxmire maintained that the overall figure would be of no use
to the Russians, there being "no way the Soviet Union can interpret
whether our overall figure indicates what we are doing" with regard
to particular intelligence programs, since decreased cost might merely
mean greater efficiency.'12 Furthermore, said Proxmire:
much is spent on satellites, and how much is spent by the CIA itself and where. Fol-
lowing a series of... inferences based on all the information they already have from
us, from the newspapers . . . they will be able to make fairly good calculations." Id.
at 9610.
123. Id. at 9609 (remarks of Senator McClellan).
124. Id. at 8605 (remarks of SenatorPastore), 9606 (remarks of Senator Jackson
and Senator Humphrey), 9612 (remarks of Senator Thurmond and Senator Goldwater).
There was no explanation of why, if such information was to be revealed at all, security
could not be preserved by holding a closed session. This procedure has been utilized
in the past when the Senate has debated CIA matters. See 112 CoNG. Rnc. 15677
(1966).
125. 120 CoNG. REc. 9604 (daily ed. June 4, 1974) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
126. Id. at 9606 (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
127. Id. (remarks of Senator Pastore and Senator Proxmire). It is doubtful that
most senators could find out very much privately, as Senator Pastore suggested. Senator
McClellan, chairman of the Appropriations Committee, stated that when colleagues had
come to him seeking information, he was "torn between the personal desire to make them
acquainted with everything ... and the duty to help maintain and preserve our national
security... I have to make that choice." Id. at 9609 (remarks of Senator McClel-
lan).
128. Id. at 9609 (remarks of Senator Proxmire).
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I have not heard one, single, solitary, real, hypothetical, or imag-
inary example of how any damage is going to be done to the United
States of America. . .. I have heard generalizations as to what
might happen if we were to release information not called for by
this amendment. That does not make any sense. ,Because we pro-
vide the overall total figure for intelligence does not mean we are
going to tell anything about the CIA.
• . . [1]f this amendment is wrong, the burden of proof cer-
tainly is on those who would say it is wrong; because what we are
doing is simply providing the taxpayer what they [sic] are entitled
to know, information on where their [sic] money goes ...
So I say that proof has been lacking and I see no examples
at all of any damage this could do.' 29
The proof Senator Proxmire demanded was not forthcoming.
Nonetheless, his amendment was defeated by a vote of 55 to 33.3O
Thus, twenty-six years after the passage of the CIA Act, the CIA
budget remains shrouded in secrecy. On those rare occasions when
Congress has considered proposals to diminish the secrecy, the de-
bate has centered around matters of policy, with no consideration of
the question of whether the present procedures are constitutional.' 3 '
The substantive constitutional issues which the courts would have
faced had the Richardson cases been allowed to proceed on their mer-
its remain to be considered.
The Constitutional Mandate
Richardson apparently did not allege that CIA funds were not
spent "in consequence of appropriations made by law" as required by
the first part of article 1, section 9, clause 7.13 Since the judicial
opinions in the second Richardson case133 focused primarily upon the
standing issue, they offer little guidance in determining the extent of
the mandate contained in the statement and account requirement of the
second half of the clause. Judge Rosenn of the Third Circuit did
express the view that the framers of the Constitution intended to insure
that the public would receive an accounting from the government.
Contrasting the use of the word "publish" in the clause with another
constitutional requirement that the president provide Congress with in-
129. Id. at 9610.
130. Id. at 9613 (roll call vote).
131. The single exception was Senator McGovern's passing comment in 1971. See
text accompanying note 106 supra.
132. Richardson sought to enjoin not CIA spending itself, but rather publication of
the COMBINED STATEMENT which did not account for this spending. See text accom-
panying note 11 supra.
133. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Richardson v. United
States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972),
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formation on the state of the union,13 4 he concluded that the right to an
accounting ran not just to Congress, but to the citizenry.13 5
Justice Douglas rea6hed the same conclusion. Acknowledging
that secrecy has "some constitutional sanction,"'13 6 such as that in the
provision excusing Congress from publishing reports in its journal
about proceedings requiring secrecy,3 7 Douglas maintained that "the
difference was great when it came to an accounting of public money.
Secrecy was the evil at which Art. I, section 9, clause 7 was aimed."''
38
Chief Justice Burger, however, offered a different point of view.
In a footnote to his majority opinion in Richardson, he maintained
that "historical analysis of the genesis of clause 7 suggests that it was in-
tended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental opera-
tions.' 39
Few would deny that the framers of the Constitution intended to
allow some secrecy of certain "governmental operations." The subject
of clause 7, however, is not operations per se, but rather the accounting
of governmental receipts and expenditures. "Historical analysis" of
the available records indicates an intent on the part of all partici-
pants in the debates to insure the greatest possible disclosure of such
accounting information. 40  The only suggestions that the clause
would permit secrecy came not from its supporters, but from those
who opposed it on the ground that it failed to specify a time period
within which the accounts were to be published.' 41 As the discussion
below reveals, no participant in the debates over the wording of the
clause expressed any desire to permit secrecy.
Constitutional History
The first part of clause 7, providing that no funds could be re-
moved from the treasury except "in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law," was not included in the original draft of the Constitu-
tion, but was added early in the proceedings.' 42 There was apparently
no debate over the provision, but early in the nation's history, Justice
Story observed that it made Congress the guardian of the public treas-
134. U.S. CoNsT., art. 11, § 3.
135. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1972).
136. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 199 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
137. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
138. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 199 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 178 n.11 (opinion of the Court).
140. See text accompanying notes 151-54 infra.
141. 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN Tm SEvERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON Tim ADOPTION
OF Tnm FEDERAL CONSTrruTION 460, 462 (1881) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT].
142. 2 . STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1348, at 222 (5th ed. 1891).
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ure, with the power to decide how and when the money should be
spent. The purpose of the clause was "to secure regularity, punctuali-
ty, and fidelity, in the disbursements of the public money.' ' 43 With-
out the clause, said Story,
the executive would possess an unbounded power over the public
purse ...and might apply all its moneyed resources at his pleas-
ure. The power to control and direct the appropriations consti-
tutes a most useful and salutory check upon profusion and extrava-
gance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public speculation. In
arbitrary governments, the prince levies what money he pleases
from his subjects, disposes of it as he thinks proper, and is beyond
responsibility or reproof. ,It is wise to interpose, in a republic, ev-
ery restraint, by which the public treasure, the common fund of all,
should be applied with unshrinking honesty to such objects as legiti-
mately belong to the common defence and the general welfare.144
Story noted that the constitutional provision required congres-
sional authorization even of judicially ascertained claims. While con-
ceding that this might be deemed a defect, he nonetheless noted that,
"evils of an opposite nature" might occur if such claims were to be
routinely paid without a prior appropriation, since this might provide
an opportunity for collusion between the claimant and treasury offi-
cials. 145
The statement and account requirement in the clause was not
added until very late in the proceedings of the constitutional conven-
tion.146 It attracted relatively little debate when it was proposed during
the discussion on revisions to the draft submitted by the committee on
style. At that time, George Mason moved to insert a clause requiring
that "an Account of the public expenditures should be annually pub-
lished."'1 47 Gouverneur Morris and Rufus King found the proposal
impracticable, since in King's view "the term expenditures went to ev-
ery minute shilling."'14 Congress might even order a monthly publi-
cation, argued King, but it would be so general that it would "afford
no satisfactory information."' 49
James Madison then proposed that the words "from time to
time" be substituted for the word "annually." Noting that the Articles
of Confederation had required semi-annual publication,' 5" and that
143. Id.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 223.
146. M. FARRAND, THE FRAmiNG oF THE CoNsrrrunow or Fm UNrrED STATES
187-88 (1913).
147. J. MIA~soN, Noms ON Tra DEBATES IN m FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
641 (A. Koch ed., 1966) [hereinafter cited as Madison].
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Article IX of the Articles of Confederation provided that Congress "shall have
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the requirement had often been impossible to meet, he observed: "Re-
quire too much and the difficulty will beget a habit of doing noth-
ing.9151
Madison's proposal met with general approval and the clause was
amended to reflect his wording and adopted.152
In several of the state ratification debates, misgivings were ex-
pressed regarding the vagueness of the phrase "from time to time." In
New York, such an expression of concern brought the following re-
sponse:
The CHANCELLOR asked if the public were more anxious
about anything under heaven than the expenditure of money. Will
not the representatives . . . consider it as essential to their popu-
larity, to gratify their constituents with full and frequent statements
of the public accounts? There can be no doubt of it.153
The most illuminating discussion of these concerns occurred at
the Virginia convention, where the participants included both Mason,
who had advocated annual publication, and Madison, who had pro-
posed the less definite wording.
Mr. GEORGE MASON apprehended the loose expression of
"publication from time to time" was . . . equally applicable to
monthly and septennial periods . . . . The reason urged in favor
of this ambiguous expression was, that there might be some mat-
ters which require secrecy. In matters relative to military opera-
tions and foreign negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes;
but he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the
public money ought ever to be concealed. The people . . . had
a right to know the expenditures of their money; but. . . this ex-
pression was so loose [the expenditure] might be concealed for-
ever from them, and might afford opportunities of misapplying the
public money, and sheltering those who did it ....
Mr. LEE... thought such trivial argument... would have
no weight . . . . He conceived the expression to be sufficiently
explicit and satisfactory. It must be supposed to mean. . . short,
convenient periods. It was as well as if it had said one year, or
authority To ... appropriate and apply [necessary sums of money] for defraying the
public expenses: To borrow money or emit bills on the Credit of the United States
transmitting every half year to the respective tates an account of the sums of money
so borrowed or emitted." (emphasis added.)
This requirement differed significantly from the constitutional provision in that the
accounting was to be transmitted to the states, rather than to the general public.
151. MADisoN, supra note 147, at 641.
152. Id.
153. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 141, at 347 (emphasis added). During the debates in
North Carolina, similar questions were raised with regard to the frequency of publication
required of the congressional journal. William R. Davie, who had been a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention, replied that "there could be no doubt of their publishing
them as often as it would be convenient and proper," and that this would be at least
once annually. 4 ELLOT at 72.
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a shorter term. Those who would neglect this provision would dis-
obey the most pointed directions.
Mr. MADISON thought it much better than if it had men-
tioned any specified period; because, if the accounts of the public
receipts and expenditures were to be published at short, stated pe-
riod, they would not be so full and connected as would be necessary
for a thorough comprehension of them, and detection of any errors.
But by . . . publishing them from time to time, as might be found
easy and convenient, they would be more full and satisfactory to
the public, and would be sufficiently frequent.154
The above colloquy discloses several important points: (1) no
one advocated secrecy, nor did anyone challenge Mason's assertion
that the public had a "right to know"; (2) the disagreement con-
cerned the question of whether fullest disclosure could be obtained by
specifying particular periods for publication, or by allowing flexibili-
ty; and (3) the only issue in dispute was whether or not a particular
time period should be specified. It seems to have been taken for grant-
ed that, when the accounting was published, it was to be full and ac-
curate. Indeed, this was the very reason Madison cited for allowing
flexibility. In retrospect, the date seems somewhat academic, since
as Lee suggested, annual publication became the standard procedure.
CIA Funding and National Security
In view of the history and purposes of clause 7, CIA funding and
accounting procedures appear on their face to be unconstitutional.
While the congressional appropriation power is admittedly flexible,' 55
it is difficult to imagine that the power could be so broad as to permit
the clandestine transfer of appropriated funds from the designated
agency to another agency "without regard to any provisions of
law."' 5 6 To maintain that this is a proper exercise of the appropriation
154. 3 ELUOT, supra note 141, at 459-60 (emphasis added). None of the available
historical records provide support for Mason's representation that the phrase "from time
to time" was designed to facilitate secrecy.
155. See, e.g., Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1936). 'That
Congress has wide discretion in the matter of prescribing details of expenditures for
which it appropriates must, of course, be plain. Appropriations and other acts of Con-
gress are replete with instances of general appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted
and expended as directed by designated government agencies." Id. at 321-22.
156. 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970). That this provision goes beyond the bounds of
legitimate congressional discretion is suggested by Willoughby: "Tlhe appropriating
power of Congress does not go further than to authorize the expenditure of public
moneys of the United States and to provide instrumentalities or rules and regulations
whereby assurance may be had that the moneys thus appropriated will actually be used
for the purposes for ... which their expenditure has been authorized by Congress." 1
W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTrUTIONAL LAw oF THE UITED STArES § 63, at 104 (2d
ed. 1929) (emphasis added).
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power is to maintain that the prohibition against money being drawn
from the treasury other than "in consequence of appropriations made
by law" may be suspended at any time Congress wishes. Perhaps even
more overwhelming in its implications is the authorization for funds
transferred to the CIA to be spent "without regard to limitations of
appropriations from which transferred."'157 This provision permits the
executive to circumvent the intent of Congress regarding the use of
appropriated funds.'5 8 Moreover, the requirement of a published ac-
counting of receipts and expenditures is rendered meaningless if one
agency may be exempted completely from the accounting, and the
statement of expenditures of those agencies from which funds are
transferred is false or misleading.
If the constitutionality of the funding provisions of the CIA Act
is to be sustained, it must be on national security grounds based on
the congressional war powers provided by Article 1, section 8.189 Such
powers are not absolute, however, as Chief Justice Warren observed:
[Tihe phrase "war power" cannot be invoked as a talismanic in-
cantation to support any exercise of congressional power which can
be brought within its ambit. .... [The] concept of "national de-
fense" cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise
of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in
the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those values
and ideals which set this Nation apart.'60
There are certain constitutional guarantees that need not always
yield to assertions of national security. The "Pentagon Papers" case'6,
presented the Supreme Court with the task of attempting to formulate
standards to be applied in situations where prior restraint of free ex-
pression is attempted on national security grounds. While the issues in
that case are somewhat different from those involved with disclosure
157. 50 U.S.C. § 403f(a) (1970). A more general clause in the CIA Act gives
blanket authorization that "sums made available to the Agency may be expended without
regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Govern-
ment funds." Id. § 403i(b).
158. For an excellent discussion of the extent to which congressional intent may
be circumvented, and methods by which Congress may impose substantive limitations
on the use of funds by the CIA, see generally Futterman, supra note 107, at 448-55.
159. One commentator has suggested several other theories which might be ad-
vanced in defense of the constitutionality of the CIA practices: "Room might be found
within the phrase 'from time to time.' Congress' authority over the detail to be in-
cluded in the Combined Statement might authorize the practice. The secrecy might find
some support in Congress' acknowledged power to withhold certain proceedings from
publication in its journals, or it might be considered a longstanding practice and therefore
presumed constitutional." Secret Funding, supra note 69, at 621-22.
The commentator has convincingly demonstrated the lack of viability of these the-
ories. Id. at 622-26.
160. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967) (emphasis added).
161. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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of CIA appropriations, the conflicting interests present in both situa-
tions indicate that a brief examination of that case is in order.
The per curiam decision of the six-justice majority was very brief
and general, stating only that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of ex-
pression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity,"' 62 and that the government had not met its
"heavy burden of showing justification."'1 3 The Court thus rejected
the government's assertion that prior restraint was permissible wher-
ever publication of materials was alleged to pose a "grave and imme-
diate danger to the security of the United States."' 64
Each justice wrote a separate opinion in an attempt to deal with
the issue more specifically. Justice Black viewed the First Amend-
ment as providing absolute freedom of the press, which he viewed as a
necessary protection for the press "so that it could bare the secrets of
government and inform the people."'65 In Justice Black's view, na-
tional security could never justify prior restraint:
The word "security" is a broad, vague generality whose con-
tours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental law em-
bodied in the First Amendment. The guarding of military and dip-
lomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative govern-
ment provides no real security for our Republic. The Framers of
the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need to defend a
new nation and the abuses of. . . governments, sought to give this
new society strength and security by providing that freedom of
speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged.' 66
Justice Douglas similarly asserted that the First Amendment provided
an absolute guarantee,' 6 7 although he left open the question of wheth-
er some degree of restriction could be valid in the event of a formal
declaration of war.168
Justice Brennan viewed First Amendment rights as very nearly ab-
solute:
The entire thrust of the Government's claim . . . has been that
publication of the material sought to be enjoined "could," or
"might," or "may" prejudice the national interest in various ways.
But the First Amendment tolerates absolutely no prior judicial re-
straints on the press predicated upon surmise or conjecture that un-
toward consequences may result . . . . Thus, only governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperil-
162. Id. at 714.
163. Id.
164. See 403 U.S. 714, 741 (Marshall, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 720 (Douglas, I., concurring).
168. Id. at 722.
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ing the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the
issuance of an interim restraining order.1 69
Justices Stewart, White and Marshall all agreed that the govern-
ment had not met its burden, but did not articulate any explicit stand-
ards to be applied in prior restraint situations.' 0 In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Harlan implied that prior restraint was permissible in
cases where the head of an executive department, such as the secre-
tary of state or the secretary of defense, made a determination that
"disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the nation-
al security.' ' 71
Although the "Pentagon Papers" case dealt with First Amend-
ment rights, the statement and account clause poses similar consid-
erations. The framers of both provisions realized that public access to
information about the government was essential to a democratic soci-
ety, and both provisions were enacted as means of guaranteeing dis-
semination of such information. As Justice Stewart has recognized,
public access to information regarding matters of defense and foreign
affairs is particularly important.
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present
in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon
executive policy and power in the areas of national defense and
international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an
informed and critical public opinion which alone can here protect
the values of democratic government.172
Justice Stewart's remarks suggest an integral relationship be-
tween the public's right to obtain information about the conduct of
government, and the right of free expression. Without the former, the
latter is reduced to the freedom to express uninformed opinion, which
is hardly conducive to effective democratic government.
In other contexts, the Court has recognized an implicit First
Amendment right to receive information: "It is now well established
that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and
ideas. . . . This right . . . is fundamental to our free society." 73
169. Id. at 725-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., concurring), 730 (White, J., concurring), 740 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 737 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). This statement echoes
the sentiments of Madison, who wrote: "A popular government, without popular infor-
mation, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or per-
haps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."
Letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 Tim WarnNcs OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G.
Hunted. 1910).
173. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Griswold v. Connecti-
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Irrespective of the First Amendment, the statement and account
clause may be viewed as vesting in the public a fundamental right to
know how tax dollars are being spent. It will be remembered that the
existence of such a right was asserted by George Mason, the original
proponent of the statement and account requirement, and was denied
by none of the participants in the constitutional debates.' 4
The importance of this right does not, of course, necessarily indi-
cate that the same standards relevant to prior restraint of expression
are applicable. In the "Pentagon Papers" case, several of the justices
indicated that prior restraint is to be regarded as a peculiar evil, and
that they did not regard normal governmental classification of infor-
mation as offensive.17 5 However, they were referring to nonfinancial
information, which the government does not have an explicit constitu-
tional duty to reveal. Where such a duty does exist, the failure to per-
form it is analogous to prior restraint in the nature and seriousness of
its consequences. It therefore seems appropriate to employ similar
standards with respect to governmental assertions of national security.
Exactly which standard should be adopted is somewhat specula-
tive. From a purely practical perspective, it is difficult to conceive of
the government's duty to disclose financial information as absolute.
No one at the Constitutional Convention disputed Rufus King's asser-
tion that it would be impossible to account for "every minute shill-
ing," 7 and such a detailed accounting would certainly seem impossi-
ble in today's highly complex governmental structure. The duty being
less than absolute, it is not unreasonable to assume that there may be
circumstances under which its performance should be excused on na-
tional security grounds. A standard resembling Justice Brennan's for-
mulation of publication resulting inevitably in very serious damage to
the nation's interests 77 would seem most appropriate to the needs of a
democratic society. Perhaps, however, even Justice Harlan's less
stringent requirements of a determination that "disclosure of the subject
matter would irreparably impair the national security"'7 8 would be
sufficient.
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
174. See text accompanying note 154 eupra. This right was su_,ggested by both Jus-
tice Douglas and Justice Stewart in their dissenting opinions in Richardson. 418 U.S.
166, 199 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 202 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
175. See 403 U.S. 713, 728-30 (Stewart, J., concurring), 733 (White, J., concur-
ring), 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
267 (1967).
176. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
177. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
178. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 737 (Harlan, J., dissent-
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If Congress may legitimately limit the government's duty of dis-
closure of some financial information on national security grounds, it
is necessary to determine the permissible form and scope of such limi-
tations. In United States v. Robel, the Supreme Court held that:
when legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute
which imposes a substantial burden on protected First Amendment
activities, Congress must achieve its goal by means which have a
"less drastic" impact on the continued vitality of First Amendment
freedoms. 179
Again the Court was concerned with First Amendment rights-
in this case the right of free association. It seems clear, however, that
the same test should be applied to burdens imposed on the right to
know about government finances. That right is just as fundamental as
the right of association, which is not mentioned in the Constitution.'"0
Like the right to-associate, the right to know is essential to the exercise
of explicit First Amendment rights.' 8 '
With regard to the constitutionality of the financial portions of
the CIA Act, two questions must be answered: (1) Would disclosure
of CIA appropriations necessarily result in grave harm to the security
of the nation?;1sz and (2) If so, could such harm be avoided by
means having a less drastic impact on the interests served by the state-
ment and account clause?
When CIA funding has been debated in Congress, phrases such
as "national security" have been invoked as "talismanic incanta-
tions' 83 by those defending total secrecy. Of course full disclosure of
the CIA budget might be harmful, but there has been a total lack of
evidence that disclosure of the overall appropriation and expenditure
figures would result in any damage to the nation's interests.' 84 It must
by concluded that the present system of camouflaged funding is not
the least drastic means of protecting national security. The provisions
179. 389 U.S. 258, 268. Significantly, the Court explicitly declined to balance gov-
ernmental interests against individual rights, requiring that legislation be narrowly drawn
to avoid a conflict between the two. Id., n.20.
180. See id. at 282-83 (White, J., dissenting). It has been maintained that "one
need not believe that the [statement and account] Clause has the preeminent status ac-
corded the First Amendment. . .in order to accept a test similar to Robel's for analyz-
ing apparent violations." Secret Funding, supra note 69, at 628.
181. See text accompanying note 172 supra.
182. Various other formulations of the question could be substituted. See text ac-
companying notes 177-78 supra.
183. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
184. See text accompanying note 129 supra. Indeed, Senator Proxmire has ar-
gued that such disclosure would enhance security because knowledge of a substantial in-
telligence budget might deter potential adversaries from engaging in aggressive activities.
120 CONG. Ruc. 9603 (daily ed. June 4, 1974).
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in the CIA Act for transfer of funds and exemption from accounting
are therefore unconstitutional.
If total disclosure of CIA finances would jeopardize the national
security and total concealment is unconstitutional, then the problem
remaining is to locate that point between the two extremes at which legiti-
mate national interests are protected with the least drastic intrusion on
constitutional safeguards. In order to make such a determination, one
must give some consideration to the nature of CIA activities.
Although the CIA was established for the primary purpose of in-
telligence coordination, it has never in practice been limited to that
function. A high priority and substantial financial commitment of the
agency has been its "covert actions," which involve a wide range of
methods used to influence the internal politics of other nations-1 5 The
agency and its supporters find a mandate for such actions in a catch-
all clause of the CIA Act which authorizes the agency "to perform
such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the
national security as the National Security Council may from time to
time direct."' 6
There are those who feel that this provision has been given an
overly expansive reading in order to justify the clandestine operations
of the agency..8 7 One of such persuasion is the former chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, who dur-
ing 1971 commented:
185. "At present the agency uses about two thirds of its funds and its manpower
for covert operations and their support . . . . 11,000 personnel and roughly $550 mil-
lion are earmarked for the Clandestine Services and those activities . . . such as com-
munications, logistics, and training, which contribute to covert activities. Only about
20 percent of the CIA's career employees (spending less than 10 percent of the budget)
work on intelligence analysis and information processing." MARCHETTI & MARKS, supra
note 64, at 78-79.
For detailed accounts of a number of covert actions by former CIA officers, ree
generally MARcsmI & MARKS, supra note 64, and AGEE, supra note 94.
186. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (1970).
187. "Nowhere. . . does the... Act... purport to confer upon the C.I.A. the
authority to engage in the type of covert activity necessary to topple foreign govern-
ments, invade the territory of unfriendly states, interfere in the domestic affairs of other
countries, and engage in general acts of sabotage ....
"It could well be argued that the directive of the National Security Council purport-
ing to authorize the C.I.A. to engage in [such] acts . . . is beyond the authority con-
ferred by the Act. . . . Revolutions, the fomenting of strikes, interference in elections
-these activites would appear to be a far cry from matters related to intelligence as
defined by the law." Walden, supra note 79, at 81.
"The C.I.A. was touted as being exclusively an intelligence coordinating body, and
it was created as such. That it has ranged far and wide in its activities since that time
is a commentary on the arrogation of powers by bureaucratic agencies and an amazing
example of the expansion of administrative power." Id. at 84.
See also OvEusicrT & AccouNTiLrrry, supra note 70, at 13-14.
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It is very unusual that we have an agency called an intelligence
agency out operating a war .... It is not gathering intelligence
in Laos; I submit it is organizing and paying for a war. It is run-
ning airlines and paying for them. That is not intelligence gather-
ing at all.' ss
It is highly questionable whether Congress intended to authorize
such actions in the enabling legislation. There was no discussion of
non-intelligence functions in the House and Senate debates on either
the National Security Act or the CIA Act. During congressional hear-
ings on the National Security Act, Secretary of the Navy James V. For-
restal denied rumors that the CIA would become engaged in opera-
tional activities."8 9
Whatever the congressional intent, in subsequent years covert
actions became so commonplace that former President Truman ob-
served in 1963 that the CIA had "got out of hand."'190 Truman ex-
panded upon this assessment by explaining that:
as nearly as I can make out, those fellows in the CIA don't just
report on wars and the like, they go out and make their own, and
there's nobody to keep track of what they're up to. They spend
billions of dollars on stirring up trouble so they'll have something
to report on. . . . [I]t's become a government all of its own and
all secret. They don't have to account to anybody.191
Apart from their dubious legality, there is considerable doubt as
to whether most covert actions are necessary or desirable. Such ac-
tions are directed not against the Soviet Union or China (the only na-
tions capable of posing a serious military threat to the United States),
but rather against leftist governments and revolutionary movements
in third world nations.' 92 Even against these minor powers, CIA op-
erations have often failed, the classic example being the abortive Bay
of Pigs invasion in 196 1.3 Successful covert actions may pose prob-
lems of their own, such as the intense controversy surrounding the
CIA's subversion of the democratically elected Marxist government in
Chile.194
188. 117 CONG. REG. 42929 (1971) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
189. Hearings on the National Security Act of 1947 Before the House Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 120-21 (1947).
190. M. MILLER, PLAIN SPEAKING: AN ORAL BioGRAPHY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 391
(1974).
191. Id. at 391-92 (emphasis in original).
192. See MARcHrmr & MARKs supra note 64, at 373. See generally AGEE supra
note 94.
193. A similar, though less spectacular failure was the CIA effort to overthrow the
Sukarno government in Indonesia in 1958. MARcHETr & MARKS supra note 64, at 29,
114.
194. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 7; Sept. 17, 1974, at 10, col. 3; Sept.
20, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Sept. 21, 1974, at 12, col. 3; Oct. 21, 1974, at 2, col. 3; Oct.
23, 1974, at 2, col. 2; Los Angeles Times, Oct. 6, 1974, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
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Opinion on CIA funding procedures has tended to correlate with
opinion on covert actions. One faction approves of covert actions, and
favors continued secret funding on the ground that it is necessary for
the success of such operations.19 The other faction has favored in-
creased disclosure on the grounds that clandestine operations should
be curtailed, and that extensive secrecy is not required for convention-
al intelligence activities. 19 6
In the aftermath of last fall's revelations concerning the Chilean
involvement, Congress sharply restricted the CIA's authority to con-
duct covert actions, prohibiting funds from being spent on such activ-
ities without prior orders from the president and notification of the
appropriate congressional committees. 97 This should result in a major
reduction in the amount of funds spent on such operations and a con-
comitant decrease in the necessity for secret funding.
Most conventional intelligence activities would seem to require
relatively little funding secrecy. Much of the information gathered
comes from open sources such as newspapers and academic jour-
195. See, e.g., 117 CONe. REC. 42929, 42930 (1971) (remarks of Senator Young).
196. See, e.g., MARCHErr & MAnxs, supra note 64, at 373-77. Former Solicitor
General Erwin N. Griswold addressed himself to these concerns in a footnote to the
Rockefeller Commission's report: "Congress should, in my opinion, decide by law
whether and to what extent the CIA should be an action organization, carrying out
operations as distinguished from the gathering and evaluation of intelligence. If action
operations were limited, there would be a lessened need for secrecy, and the adverse
effect which the activities of the CIA sometimes have on the credibility of the United
States would be modified.
One of the great strengths of this country is a deep and wide-flung capacity for
goodwill. Those who represent us, both at home and abroad, should recognize the
potentiality of that goodwill and take extreme care not to undermine it, lest their
efforts be in fact counter-productive to the long-range security interests of the United
States. ROCxEFELLER COMMiSSioN, supra note 4a, at 81, n.3.
197. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. §§ 2422, 2423) was amended,
and the new § 2422 provided that: "No funds appropriated under the authority of this
chapter or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for ob-
taining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such opera-
tion is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely
fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the
Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House of Representatives." Pub.
L. No. 93-559; 88 Stat. 1795 § 32 (1974).
This was the first time the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees had
been given any jurisdiction over the CIA. Early this year, Senator John Sparkman, the
new chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a letter to CIA Director Wil-
liam Colby calling his attention to the new restriction, and advising him to review cur-
rent CIA activities to determine which of them "may conceivably be viewed as within
the scope of the law." N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
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nals.198 There would likewise appear to be little harm possible in re-
vealing CIA expenditures on a number of routine items. The amount
of money spent on ordinary office supplies, for instance, would be of
little stategic interest to the Soviets. Similarly, it is not likely that the
nation would be imperiled by disclosure of the total amount spent on
salaries for career employees. Through their own intelligence efforts,
the Soviets have already learned much more significant information
about the CIA, apparently with minimal adverse consequences. 099
With the foregoing considerations in mind, some general assess-
ments can be made regarding the constitutionality of CIA funding
procedures under various modifications. The method which would
preserve the most secrecy is Senator Proxmire's proposal to disclose
the total amount spent by all intelligence agencies.200 There would be
a single sum appropriated for all intelligence activities, which might
meet the clause 7 requirement that expenditures be "in consequence
of appropriations made by law," even though most appropriations are
far more specific. The scheme would provide a substantial improve-
ment by eliminating present inaccuracies in the budget figures and
Combined Statement which result from secret transfers of funds. This
method would not, however, satisfy the requirement of a "regular" ac-
counting, of all receipts and expenditures, since it would not disclose
receipts and expenditures for individual agencies. There is no evi-
denced need for this much secrecy. Thus, the Proxmire approach,
while a major improvement, would fall short of constitutional stand-
ards.
198. "[Olver 80 per cent of the information that goes into finished intelligence re-
ports is from overt sources such as scientific and technical journals, political speeches
and other public documents." AGEE, supra note 94, at 40.
There are significant exceptions to this general rule, however. Early this year, for
instance, it was revealed that the CIA had spent over $350 million over a period of sev-
eral years in a remarkable, highly secret project to recover a sunken Russian submarine.
See Los Angeles Times, Feb. 8, 1975, § 1, at 18, col. 1; Mar. 19, 1975, § 1, at 1, col.
5; N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.); Mar. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 3 (city
ed.).
199. "[n many instances the opposition knows exactly what covert operations are
being targeted against it, and it takes counteraction when possible. The U-2 overflights
and, later, those of the photographic satellites were, and are, as well known to the So-
viets and the Chinese as Soviet overhead reconnaissance of the United States is to the
CIA; there is no way, when engaging in operations of this magnitude, to keep them se-
cret from the opposition. It, too, employs a professional intelligence service. In fact,
from 1952 to 1964, at the height of the Cold War, the Soviet KGB electronically inter-
cepted even the most secret messages routed through the code room of the U.S. embassy
in Moscow. This breach in secrecy, however, apparently caused little damage to U.S.
national security . . . ." MARCHE & MARKS, supra note 64, at 7. See also AGEE,
supra note 94, at 68-69.
200. See note 118 pupra.
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Senator McGovern's proposal 0 1 closely resembles that of Sena-
tor Proxmire, but would provide disclosure of the overall CIA budget,
rather than that of the entire intelligence community. This might be
sufficient disclosure under the Constitution, since the Combined
Statement does not provide much more detail than the total receipts
and expenditures for certain other agencies. 20 2 Still, there would be
unnecessary secrecy, and it is questionable whether this proposal
would meet a "least drastic impact" test.
The approach most likely to comply with the Constitution and
most suitable for a democratic society (short of full disclosure) would
be patterned after the funding procedures for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Atomic Energy Commission .20  This would
provide for open, itemized appropriations and expenditures for non-
sensitive items. Additionally, a specified amount would be appro-
priated for confidential purposes for which the director of central in-
telligence would only account by certificate. This type of procedure
has apparently provided sufficient confidentiality for the FBI and the
AEC, and there is no reason to believe it would not be adequate for
the legitimate needs of the CIA. Such a procedure would also have the
support of longstanding precedent.20 4
Prospects for Reform
If portions of the CIA Act are unconstitutional, how might this
anomoly be resolved? Ordinarily questions of such gravity are re-
solved either through litigation or legislation. The opportunity to liti-
gate the issue, however, has been denied the citizen-taxpayer by the
Supreme Court's Richardson holding.20 5 And Congress has a past
record of refusing to enact even the most modest reforms. Nonethe-
less, neither door has been closed entirely.
Further Litigation
Holding that William Richardson had standing to litigate the is-
sue, Judge Rosenn of the Third Circuit observed that if Richardson:
201. See note 104 supra.
202. For instance, the accounting for the AEC is broken down into just three cate-
gories: operating expenses, plant and capital equipment, and advances for cooperative
work. COMBINED STATEMENT, supra note 50, at 392 (fiscal year 1972). More detailed
budget information is available, however, including the amounts allocated for nuclear
materials, weapons, reactor development, and isotopes development. APPENDiX To THE
BUDGET, supra note 61, at 797 (fiscal year 1972).
203. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
204. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
205. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). For a discussion of the
possibility that a plaintiff with a more carefully drafted complaint seeking specifically
to enjoin CIA expenditures would be held to have standing, see OvERSIGHT & AccouNrTr-
AmLrry, supra note 70, at 28-29.
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as a citizen, voter and taxpayer, is not entitled to maintain an ac-
tion. . to enforce the dictate of. .. the United States Constitu-
tion that the Federal Government provide an accounting of the ex-
penditure of all public money, then it is difficult to see how this
requirement, which the framers of the Constitutions considered vi-
tal to the proper functioning of our democratic republic, may be en-
forced at all.206
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed the Third Cir-
cuit's holding in Richardson, a careful reading of the Supreme Court's
decision reveals that the possibility of future litigation of this issue
may not be entirely precluded. In support of its holding the Court
quoted the following passage from a prior decision:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or
legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immedi-
ately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that
action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest
common to all members of the public.2
0 7
Richardson was held to lack standing because his was a "general in-
terest common to all members of the public." It does not necessarily
follow, however, that no potential litigant exists who might allege and
demonstrate a sufficiently "direct injury."
It has been suggested, for example, that members of Congress
might be able to "surmount the standing barrier.' 202 Another possi-
bility might be that a group of scholars from various disciplines would
allege that the unreliability of the figures listed in federal financial
statements has impaired their ability to conduct research on the effica-
cy of various government programs.2 0 9 This would certainly seem to
be a direct injury to an interest not shared by the public generally.
In addition to the hurdle posed by the standing issue, there is the
potential barrier of the political question doctrine. The chief justice
suggested in Richardson that perhaps the framers of the Constitution
intended to leave enforcement of the statement and account provision
206. Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 854 (3d Cir. 1972). See also
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (opinion of the Court), 200 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
207. 418 U.S. 166, 177-78, quoting Ex parte Ldvitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1938) (em-
phasis supplied by Chief Justice Burger).
208. Secret Funding, supra note 69, at 609. See also OvunsronT & AccomTAniurry,
supra note 70, at 29-30.
209. "Governmental secrecy prevents the layman, and even the scholar and the
Congressman" from finding answers to questions about CIA efficiency. Sperling, Cen-
tral Intelligence and Its Control: Curbing Secret Power in a Democratic Society, in 112
CONG. Rrc. 15758, 15761 (1966). Similar problems would confront one attempting to
study the efficiency of programs from which CIA funds are transferred.
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to the discretion of Congress. 210 Justice Douglas took vigorous excep-
tion to this notion:
One has only to read constitutional history to realize that state-
ment would shock Mason and Madison. Congress of course has
discretion; but to say that it has the power to read the clause out
of the Constitution when it comes to one or two or three agencies
is astounding. That is the bare-bones issue in the present case.
Does Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, of the Constitution permit Congress to with-
hold "a regular Statement and Account" respecting any agency it
chooses? Respecting all federal agencies? What purpose, what
function is the clause to perform under the Court's construction?211
Justice Douglas concluded that the question was not political un-
der the Baker v. Carr test of "a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate polical department. '11 2
Baker v. Carr indicated a trend toward lowering the political
question barrier by the Court. In view of the language of the majority
opinion in Richardson, however, there is a possibility that the Court
might curtail this trend, as it did with the trend toward relaxing tax-
payer standing requirements.
Legislative Action
While the forecast for judicial action is less than optimistic, pros-
pects for legislative reform of CIA procedures appear to be more
promising than ever before. Last year the Ninety-third Congress re-
stricted the use of appropriated funds for covert actions.213 Following
disclosures of extensive CIA domestic activities,2 14 the reform-mind-
ed Ninety-fourth Congress quickly set in motion the first comprehen-
sive investigations of the American intelligence community.1 5 The
era of congressional inaction and inattention appears to have come to
an end, and it is likely that the present investigations wxill result in pro-
cedural and substantive reforms, as well as greatly enhanced congres-
sional oversight of CIA operations. Whether the changes include
greater disclosure of CIA finances cannot be predicted at this time.
Conclusion
For two and a half decades the United States government has
210. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
211. Id. at 200-01 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 201, quoting 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
213. See note 197 supra.
214. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 8; Dec. 25, 1974, at 1, col.
8; Dec. 29, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 30, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
It was subsequently revealed that these domestic activities included the interception
of confidential communications between Representative Bella Abzug and her legal clients.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1975, at 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
From the beginning, the CIA has been denied by law "police, subpoena, law-en-
forcement powers, [and] internal security functions." 50 U.S.C. § 403(d) (3) (1970).
215. See note 102 supra.
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been systematically circumventing the Constitution by funding the
Central Intelligence Agency through clandestine interagency trans-
fers, and by publishing financial statements that are, by design, in-
complete and inaccurate. These practices were originally justified as a
necessary protection of national interest. Even at the height of the
cold war such actions arguably did more harm and good, for as a
former CIA official has written:
[I]n fighting -totalitarian systems . .. the democratic government
runs the risk of imitating its enemies' methods and, thereby, destroy-
ing the very democracy that it is seeking to defend. I cannot help
wondering if my government is more concerned with defending our
democratic system or more intent upon imitating the methods of
totalitarian regimes in order to maintain its already inordinate
power over the American people. 216
Whatever perils the nation may have faced in 1949, very differ-
ent problems must be confronted in 1975. One of the most serious of
these problems is the inordinate power wielded by a large and com-
plex intelligence establishment which is responsive only to the will of
the executive. Even the frequently touted "power of the purse" has
ceased to exist, as Congress unknowingly permits vast sums of money
to be used by the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Such a situa-
tion has no place in a democratic society. If ours is to be a government
of laws, rather than of men,217 CIA appropriations must be made by
law, rather than by cabal, and CIA expenditures must be subjected to
at least minimal public scrutiny. Clause 7 demands no less. And if our
government officials sincerely believe that compliance with the Con-
stitution would imperil legitimate national interests, the answer lies in
amending the Constitution, not ignoring it.
216. V. Marchetti, in preface, M cnnTri & MARKs, supra note 64, at xiii.
217. 'The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation,
if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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